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Abstract
The Rabin scheme used in public-key cryptosystem is here revisited with a focus limited to a
few specific open issues. In particular, message decryption requires one out of four roots of a
quadratic equation in a residue ring to be chosen, and a longstanding problem is to identify
unambiguously and deterministically the encrypted message at the decryption side by adding
the minimum number of extra bits to the cipher-text. While the question has already been
solved for pairs of primes of the type 4k + 3, the general problem is here addressed. As one of
the major results, an explicit solution with two extra bits is provided for pairs of primes that
are congruent 5 modulo 8. The Rabin signature is also reconsidered from a deterministic point
of view: a padding mechanism is proposed that avoids relying on a certain number of attempts
until a suitable pad is found.
Keywords: Rabin cryptosystem, Jacobi symbols, Reciprocity, Residue Rings, Dedekind sums.
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1 Introduction
In 1979, Michael Rabin [26] suggested a variant of RSA with public-key exponent 2, which he
showed to be as secure as factoring. The encryption of a message m ∈ Z∗N is C = m2 mod N ,
where N = pq is a product of two prime numbers, and decryption is performed by solving the
equation
x2 = C mod N , (1)
which has four roots; thus for complete decryption, further information is needed to identify m
among these roots. More precisely, for a fully automatic (deterministic) decryption, at least two
more bits are needed (computed at the encryption stage) to identify m without ambiguity. The
advantages of using this exponent 2, compared to larger exponents, are: i) a smaller computational
burden, and ii) solving (1) is equivalent to factoring N . The disadvantages are: iii) computation,
at the encryption stage, of the information required to identify the right root, and delivery of this
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information to the decryption stage, and iv) vulnerability to chosen-plain-text attack [4, 21, 28, 15].
Several chosen methods base the selection of the correct root on the message semantics, that is
they retain the root that corresponds to the message that looks most meaningful, or the root that
contains a known string of bits. However, these methods are essentially probabilistic, and may
affect the equivalence between breaking the Rabin scheme and factoring [4]. Nevertheless, for
schemes using pairs of primes congruent 3 modulo 4 (Blum primes), Williams [31] proposed a root
identification scheme based on the computation of a Jacobi symbol, using an additional parameter
in the public key, and two additional bits in the encrypted message.
In 1988, Kurosawa et alii [18] proposed a function that is valid for every pair of primes, and
possesses similar features to the Rabin scheme. Let a be a number of ZN , N = pq, such that(
a
p
)
=
(
a
q
)
= −1
Kurosawa encryption of a message m ∈ ZN is
E = m+
a
m
with two extra bits computed as
t =

0 if
(
m
N
)
= 1
1 if
(
m
N
)
= −1
s =

0 if
a
m
> m
1 if
a
m
< m .
Decryption entails solving the quadratic equation
X2 − EX − a = 0
and choosing the root identified by the pair (t, s) [29]. This encryption algorithm is alternative
to the Rabin algorithm, and works for every pair of primes. However, it must be noted that
parameter a should be chosen appropriately, in order not to leak any information and expose the
message to attacks, e.g. if a has small order kp modulo p and large order modulo q, then akp − 1 is
divisible by p, i.e. gcd{akp − 1, N} = p.
In [19], this scheme is extensively considered and reformulated with a focus on semantic security,
together with the RSA scheme and a modification of the Rabin algorithm, called Rabin-Paillier’s
algorithm, although the price to pay is to double the number of bits in the encrypted message.
Semantic security, which is outside the scope of this paper, will not be examined in depth; however
it will be shown how similar constructions can be adapted for this scheme with pairs of primes of
the type 8k + 5.
The Rabin cryptosystem may also be used to create a signature by exploiting inverse mapping:
in order to sign m, the equation x2 = m mod N is solved and any of the four roots, say S, can be
used to form the signed message (m,S). However, if x2 = m mod N has no solution, the signature
cannot be directly generated; to overcome this, a random pad U can be used until x2 = mU mod N
is solvable, and the signature is the triple (m,U, S) [25]. A verifier compares S2 with mU mod
N , and accepts the signature as valid when these two numbers are equal. For an application to
electronic signature, an in-depth analysis of advantages and disadvantages can be found in [3].
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides preliminary results concerning the solutions
of equation (1) and the mathematics that will be needed. Section 3 describes in detail the Rabin
scheme in the standard setting, where both prime factors of N are congruent 3 modulo 4, and
proposes a new identification rule exploiting Dedekind sums. Section 4 addresses the identifi-
cation problem for any pair of primes, featuring a deterministic scheme that works with primes
congruent 5 modulo 8, based on quartic residues of Gaussian integers. A suboptimal solution that
works for any pair of primes is also presented. Section 5 considers a Rabin signature with a new
padding mechanism that avoids relying on attempts until a suitable pad is found. Forgery attacks
are also examined, and countering strategies mentioned, in using this padding factor, although
these questions are addressed more extensively in [8]. Lastly, Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = pq be a product of two odd primes p and q. Using the generalized Euclidean algorithm to
compute the greatest common divisor between p and q, two integer numbers, λ1, λ2 ∈ Z, such that
λ1p+ λ2q = 1, are efficiently computed. Then, setting ψ1 = λ2q and ψ2 = λ1p, so that ψ1 + ψ2 = 1,
it is easily verified that ψ1 and ψ2 satisfy the relations
ψ1ψ2 = 0 mod N
ψ21 = ψ1 mod N
ψ22 = ψ2 mod N .
(2)
and that ψ1 = 1 mod p, ψ1 = 0 mod q, and ψ2 = 0 mod p, ψ2 = 1 mod q. According to the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT), using ψ1 and ψ2, every element a in ZN can be represented as
a = a1ψ1 + a2ψ2 mod N ,
where a1 ∈ Zp and a2 ∈ Zq are calculated as a1 = a mod p , a2 = a mod q.
The four roots x1, x2, x3, x4 ∈ ZN of (1), represented as positive numbers, are obtained using
the CRT from the roots u1, u2 ∈ Zp and v1, v2 ∈ Zq, of the two equations u2 = C mod p and
v2 = C mod q, respectively. The roots u1 and u2 = p− u1 are of different parities; likewise, v1 and
v2 = q−v1. If p is congruent 3 modulo 4, the root u1 can be computed in deterministic polynomial-
time as ±C p+14 mod p; the same holds for q. If p is congruent 1 modulo 4, an equally simple
algorithm is not known; however, u1 can be computed in probabilistic polynomial-time using
Tonelli’s algorithm [2, 21] once a quadratic non-residue modulo p is known (this computation is
the probabilistic part of the algorithm), or using the (probabilistic) Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm
[5, 9, 30] to factor the polynomial u2−C modulo p. Using the previous notations, the four roots of
(1) can be written as 
x1 = u1ψ1 + v1ψ2 mod N
x2 = u1ψ1 + v2ψ2 mod N
x3 = u2ψ1 + v1ψ2 mod N
x4 = u2ψ1 + v2ψ2 mod N .
(3)
Lemma 1 LetN = pq be a product of two prime numbers. LetC be a quadratic residue moduloN ; the four
roots x1, x2, x3, x4 of the polynomial x2−C are partitioned into two sets X1 = {x1, x4} and X2 = {x2, x3}
such that roots in the same set have different parities, i.e. x1 = 1 + x4 mod 2 and x2 = 1 + x3 mod 2.
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Furthermore, assuming that u1 and v1 in equation (3) have the same parity, the residues modulo p and
modulo q of each root in X1 have the same parity, while each root in X2 has residues of different parities.
PROOF. Since u1 and v1 have the same parity by assumption, then also u2 and v2 have the same
parity. The connection between x1 and x4 is shown by the following chain of equalities
x4 = u2ψ1 + v2ψ2 = (p− u1)ψ1 + (q − v1)ψ2 = −x1 mod N = N − x1 ,
because pψ1 = 0 mod N and qψ2 = 0 mod N , and x1 is less than N by assumption, thus −x1 mod
N = N − x1 is positive and less than N . A similar chain connects x2 and x3 = N − x2; the
conclusion follows because N is odd and thus x1 and x4, as well as x2 and x3, have different
parities.

2.1 The Mapping R : x→ x2
The mapping R : x→ x2 is four-to-one and partitions Z∗N into disjoint subsets u of four elements
specified by equation (3). Let U be the group of the four square roots of unity, that is the roots of
x2 − 1 consisting of the four-tuple
U = {1, ψ,−ψ,−1} ,
where
ψ = ψ1 − ψ2 mod N . (4)
Obviously, U is a group of order 4 and exponent 2. Each subset u, consisting of the four square
roots of a given quadratic residue, may be described as a coset mU of U, i.e.
u = mU = {m,ψm,−ψm,−m} .
The number of these cosets is φ(N)4 , and they form a group which is isomorphic to a subgroup of
Z∗N of order φ(N)/4. Once a coset u = {x1, x2, x3, x4} is given, the problem is to identify the four
elements contained in it. By Lemma 1, each xi is identified by the pair of bits
bp = (xi mod p) mod 2, and bq = (xi mod q) mod 2 .
In summary, the table
root bp bq
x1 u1 mod 2 v1 mod 2
x2 u1 mod 2 v2 mod 2
x3 u2 mod 2 v1 mod 2
x4 u2 mod 2 v2 mod 2
shows that two bits identify each of the four roots. On the other hand, the expression of these
two bits involves the prime factorization of N , that is p and q, but when the factors of N are not
available, it is no longer possible to compute these parity bits, and the problem is to find which
parameters can be used, and the minimum number of additional bits that must be disclosed in
4
order to label a given root among the four.
Adopting the convention introduced along with equation (3), a parity bit, namely b0
.= xi mod 2,
distinguishes x1 from x4, and x2 from x3, therefore it may be one of the parameters to be used in
identifying the four roots. It remains to determine how to distinguish between roots having the
same parity, without knowing the factors of N .
2.2 Dedekind sums
A Dedekind sum is denoted by s(h, k) and defined as follows [27]. Let h, k be relatively prime and
k ≥ 1, then we set
s(h, k) =
k∑
j=1
((
hj
k
))((
j
k
))
(5)
where the symbol ((x)), defined as
((x)) =
{
x− bxc − 12 if x is not an integer
0 if x is an integer ,
(6)
denotes the well-known sawtooth function of period 1. The Dedekind sum satisfies the following
properties, see [6, 13, 27] for proofs and details:
1) h1 = h2 mod k⇒ s(h1, k) = s(h2, k)
2) s(−h, k) = −s(h, k)
3) s(h, k) + s(k, h) = −14 + 112
(
h
k +
1
hk +
k
h
)
, a property known as the reciprocity theorem for
Dedekind sums.
4) 12ks(h, k) = k + 1 − 2
(
h
k
)
mod 8 for k odd, a property connecting Dedekind sums and
Jacobi symbols.
The first three properties make it possible to compute a Dedekind sum by a method that mimics
the Euclidean algorithm and has the same efficiency. In the sequel the following Lemma is needed:
Lemma 2 If k = 1 mod 4, then, for any h relatively prime with k, the denominator of s(h, k) is odd.
PROOF. In the definition of s(h, k) the summation can be limited to k − 1, because
((
k
k
))
= 0,
furthermore, from the identity ((−x)) = −((x)) it follows that ∑k−1j=1 (( hjk
))
= 0 for every
integer h [27]. We may thus write
s(h, k) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
j
k
− 1
2
)(
hj
k
−
⌊
hj
k
⌋
− 1
2
)
=
k−1∑
j=1
j
k
(
hj
k
−
⌊
hj
k
⌋
− 1
2
)
,
since
((
hj
k
))
is never 0, because j < k and h is relatively prime with k by hypothesis. The last
summation can be split into the sum of two further summations, such that
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- the first summation
k−1∑
j=1
j
k
(
hj
k
−
⌊
hj
k
⌋)
has the denominator patently odd;
- the second summation is evaluated as −1
2
k−1∑
j=1
j
k
= −k − 1
4
.
In conclusion, the denominator of s(h, k) is odd because s(h, k) is the sum of a fraction with
odd denominator with −k−14 , which is an integer number by hypothesis.

3 The Rabin scheme: primes p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4
As said in the introduction, an important issue in using the Rabin scheme is to select the right
root at the decryption stage. If p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4, a solution to the identification problem has been
proposed by Williams [31] and is reported below, slightly modified from [25], along with three
different solutions, including a new method based on Dedekind sums.
3.1 Variant I
A simpler variant [12] exploiting the Jacobi symbol is the following:
Public-key: [N ].
Encrypted message [C, b0, b1], where
C = m2 mod N , b0 = m mod 2 and b1 =
1
2
[
1 +
(
m
N
)]
.
Decryption stage :
- compute, as in (3), the four roots, written as positive numbers,
- take the two roots having the same parity specified by b0, say z1 and z2,
- compute the numbers
1
2
[
1 +
(
z1
N
)]
1
2
[
1 +
(
z2
N
)]
and take the root corresponding to the number equal to b1.
Remark 1. The two additional bits are sufficient to uniquely identify m among the four roots,
because, as previously observed in Lemma 1, the roots have the same parity in pairs, and within
each of these pairs the roots have opposite Jacobi symbols modulo N . In fact, roots with the same
parity are of the form a1ψ1 + a2ψ2 and a1ψ1 − a2ψ2 (or −a1ψ1 + a2ψ2), whence the conclusion
follows from(
a
N
)
=
(
a1ψ1 + a2ψ2
pq
)
=
(
a1ψ1 + a2ψ2
p
)(
a1ψ1 + a2ψ2
q
)
=
(
a1
p
)(
a2
q
)
(7)
and the fact that −1 is a nonresidue modulo a Blum prime.
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3.2 Variant II
There is a second variant exploiting the Jacobi symbol which, at some extra computational cost
and with some further information in the public key, requires the delivery of no further bit, since
the information needed to decrypt it is carried by the encrypted message itself [12, 10]. An adapted
version is the following. Let ξ be an integer such that
(
ξ
p
)
= −
(
ξ
q
)
= 1, for example ξ =
α2ψ1 − ψ2 mod N , with α ∈ Z∗N . The detailed process consists of the following steps
Public-key: [N, ξ].
Encrypted message [C], where C is obtained as follows
C ′ = m2 mod N , b0 = m mod 2 , b1 =
1
2
[
1−
(
m
N
)]
and C = C ′(−1)b1ξb0 mod N .
Decryption stage :
- compute d1 = 12
[
1−
(
C
p
)]
, and set C” = C(−1)d1
- compute d0 = 12
[
1−
(
C
N
)]
, and set Cˆ = C”ξ−d0
- compute, as in (3), the four roots of Cˆ, written as positive numbers.
- take the root identified by b0 and b1
Decryption works, since we have Cˆ = C(−1)d1ξ−d0 = C ′(−1)b1ξb0(−1)d1ξ−d0 = C ′, due to the
coincidences d0 = b0 and d1 = b1. Indeed, the following two chains of equalities, which are a
consequence of the definition of ξ, the fact that C ′ is a quadratic residue modulo N , and lastly that
(−1) is a quadratic non-residue modulo p and q(
C
N
)
=
(
C ′
N
)(
(−1)b1
N
)(
ξb0
N
)
=
(
ξb0
p
)(
ξb0
q
)
=
(
ξb0
q
)
= (−1)b0
(
C
p
)
=
(
C ′
p
)(
(−1)b1
p
)(
ξb0
p
)
=
(
(−1)b1
p
)
= (−1)b1 ,
afford the final identification of d0 and d1 with b0 and b1, respectively.
Remark 2. Note that the Jacobi symbol
(
C
N
)
discloses the message parity to an eavesdropper.
3.3 Williams’ scheme
Williams [25, 31] first proposed an implementation of the Rabin cryptosystem, using a parity bit
and the Jacobi symbol, but adding an additional parameter in the public key.
The decryption process is based on the observation that, setting D = 12(
(p−1)(q−1)
4 + 1), if
b = a2 mod N and
(
a
N
)
= 1, so that
(
a
p
)
=
(
a
q
)
, we have bD = a
(
a
p
)
= a
(
a
q
)
, given
that
a
ϕ(N)
4 = (aψ1 + aψ2)
ϕ(N)
4 = a
ϕ(N)
4 ψ1 + a
ϕ(N)
4 ψ2 =
(
a
p
)
ψ1 +
(
a
q
)
ψ2 =
(
a
p
)
=
(
a
q
)
mod N,
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as a
p−1
2 =
(
a
p
)
mod p, a
q−1
2 =
(
a
q
)
mod q, p−12 and
q−1
2 are odd (cf. also Lemma 1 in [31]), and
ψ1 + ψ2 = 1.
Public-key: [N,S], where S is an integer such that
(
S
N
)
= −1.
Encrypted message [C, c1, c2], where
c1 =
1
2
[
1−
(
m
N
)]
, m¯ = Sc1m mod N , c2 = m¯ mod 2 , and C = m¯2 mod N .
Decryption stage :
compute m′ = CD mod N and N − m′, and choose the number, m′′ say, with the parity
specified by c2. The original message is recovered as
m = S−c1m′′ mod N .
3.4 A scheme based on Dedekind sums
Let m ∈ ZN be the message to be encrypted, with N = pq, p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4. The detailed process
consists of the following steps:
Public-key: [N ].
Encrypted message [C, b0, b1], where
C = m2 mod N , b0 = m mod 2 , and b1 = s(m,N) mod 2 ,
in which, due to Lemma 2, the Dedekind sum can be taken modulo 2 since the denominator
is odd.
Decryption stage :
- compute, as in (3), the four roots, written as positive numbers,
- take the two roots having the same parity specified by b0, say z1 and z2,
- compute the numbers
s(z1, N) mod 2 s(z2, N) mod 2 ,
and take the root corresponding to the number equal to b1.
The algorithm works because s(z1, N) mod 2 6= s(z2, N) mod 2 by the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 If k is the product of two Blum primes p and q, (x1, k) = 1, and x2 = x1(ψ1 − ψ2), then
s(x1, k) + s(x2, k) = 1 mod 2 .
8
PROOF.
By property 4) in Section 2.2, which compares the value of the Dedekind sum with the value of
the Jacobi symbol, we have
12Ns(x1, N) = N + 1− 2
(
x1
N
)
mod 8 and 12Ns(x2, N) = N + 1− 2
(
x2
N
)
mod 8;
summing the two expressions (member by member) and taking into account thatN = 1 mod 4 we
have
12N(s(x1, N) + s(x2, N)) = 2N + 2− 2
[(
x1
N
)
+
(
x2
N
)]
mod 8 ,
since 12N = 4 mod 8, 2N = 2 mod 8. Now, it was shown above (cf. Remark 1) that the sum of the
two Jacobi symbols is 0; then, applying Lemma 2, we have
4(s(x1, N) + s(x2, N)) = 4 mod 8 ⇒ s(x1, N) + s(x2, N) = 1 mod 2 ,
which concludes the proof.

4 Root identification for any pair of primes
If p and q are not both Blum primes, identification of m among the four roots of the equation
x2 − C, where C = m2 mod N , can be given by the pair [b0, b1] where
b0 = xi mod 2 and b1 = (xi mod p) + (xi mod q) mod 2 ,
as a consequence of Lemma 1. The bit b0 can be computed at the encryption stage without knowing
p nor q, while b1 requires, in this definition, p and q to be known, and cannot be directly computed
knowing only N .
In principle, a way to obtain b1 is to publish a pre-computed binary list (or table) that has, in posi-
tion i, the bit b1 pertaining to the messagem = i. This list does not disclose any useful information
on the factorization of N because, even if we know that the residues modulo p and modulo q have
the same parity, we do not know which parity, and if these residues have different parities we
do not know which is which. Although the list makes the task theoretically feasible, its size is of
exponential complexity with respect to N , and thus practically unrealizable.
WhenN is a product of two Blum primes, the second bit b1 can be computed using the Jacobi sym-
bol, as seen in Section 3, where b1 is obtained by exploiting properties of the quadratic residuosity.
However, for primes congruent 1 modulo 4, quadratic residuosity cannot distinguish numbers
of opposite signs and is no longer sufficient to identify the roots. Higher power residue sym-
bols could in principle do the desired job, but unfortunately their use is not straightforward, and
analogous reciprocity laws or multiplicative properties are not always at hand.
Higher power residues have, indeed, been used in some generalizations of the Rabin scheme,
working in residue rings modulo non-prime ideals of algebraic number fields. For instance,
residue rings in Eisenstein or Gauss fields were considered in [29], which introduced Rabin-like
schemes based on encryption rules involving powers of the message higher than 2. However,
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this approach does not address the problem of separating the roots of a quadratic equation in the
original Rabin scheme.
Before presenting a neat solution of this root identification problem, using quartic reciprocity for
primes congruent 5 modulo 8, the difficulties and some attempts concerning a general solution for
non-Blum primes will be examined.
Let 2k and 2h be the even exponents of Zp and Zq, respectively, that is 2k strictly divides (p−1) and
2h strictly divides (q− 1), and assume that k ≥ h. The rational power residue symbols x p−12k mod p
and x
q−1
2h mod q can then, respectively, distinguish between u1 and u2, and between v1 and v2.
Since it is desire to use N as a modulo, the idea of multiplying the exponents and considering
the function x
φ(N)
2k+h mod N , which would identify m among the 2k+h 2k-th roots of unity in Z∗N ,
is examined. The idea would be to make these roots publicly available and label them, so that
the sender of the message can tell which of them corresponds to the message actually sent. There
are two problems with this: first, the exponent φ(N)
2k+h
should also be available, but necessarily in
some masked form via multiplication by an odd number, in order to hide the factors of N ; but,
most importantly, among the public 2k-th roots of unity we would find the square roots, and in
particular K .= ψ1 − ψ2. However, the greatest common divisor of K + 1 = 2ψ1 and N yields q,
and so N would be factored.
The idea will now be clarified by examining this point in greater depth. The multiplicative group
Z∗N , the direct product of two cyclic groups Cp−1 and Cq−1, can also be viewed as the direct product
of two abelian subgroups, namely a 2-group and a group of odd order, that is
Z∗N = (C2k × C2h)×
(
C2fp+1 × C2fq+1
)
.
Therefore, every element a of Z∗N can be written as a product a2ao where ao is an element of odd
order, and a2 is an element of order a power of 2, i.e. it is an element of a 2-group which has rank
2 and exponent 2k.
The four roots V4 = {1,−1, ψ,−ψ} of 1, where ψ = ψ1 − ψ2 mod N , form a group of order 4 (the
Vierergruppe) of rank 2, and generators−1 and ψ. Let a be a quadratic residue, then its four square
roots {A,A1, A2, A3}may be written as {A,−A,Aψ,−Aψ}, choosing now to consider remainders
modulo N of absolute value less than N/2.
A specific square root m of a among {A,−A,Aψ,−Aψ} is identified by the sign of m and a further
number c, possibly a single bit, which should be computed with the constraint of using N , m, and
some additional public information that should not disclose the factors p and q ofN . Leaving aside
this last constraint for the moment, it will be shown how to compute c using a sort of residuosity
of convenient order depending on the group C2k × C2h .
Let 2fN + 1 = lcm{2fp + 1, 2fq + 1} be the maximum order of the elements in the subgroup of odd
order, therefore a2fN+1o = 1 mod N . Since 2fN + 1 and 2k are relatively prime, then a generalized
Euclidean algorithm gives α and β such that α(2fN + 1) + β2k = 1, then we have
mα(2fN+1) = (m2mo)α(2fN+1) = m
α(2fN+1)
2 m
α(2fN+1)
o = m
α(2fN+1)
2 = m
1−β2k
2 = m2 mod N .
Therefore, an exponentiation with exponent α(2fN + 1) defines an homomorphism θ of the group
Z∗N onto the subgroup G2 = C2k×C2h , such that four-tuples wb of square roots of the same element
b in Z∗N are mapped into four-tuples gθ(b) of square roots of the same element θ(b) in G2. Therefore,
in order to identify any specified four-tuple of roots, it is sufficient to consider its image in G42 . It
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Figure 1: Tree representation of the 2-group of order 2× 2 in Z∗7·19
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Figure 2: Tree representation of the 2-group of order 22 × 2 in Z∗5·7
is then useful to consider the partition of G2 into 4-tuples that are cosets of the group V4 of the
square roots of 1.
The situation can be described pictorially using a 4-ary rooted tree T with nodes labeled by the
elements of the 2-group G2. The four nodes in the first layer below the root are labeled by the four
roots of unity. In this layer, the node labeled with 1 is a terminal node; the remaining three nodes
may or may not be terminal nodes depending on the form of the primes p and q. The height of the
tree is k(≥ h); the number of nodes in each level is a multiple of 4, and depends on the forms of
the primes p and q. If there is a path (a sequence of branches) connecting a node u with a node v
of a higher layer, v is said to be above u.
As an example, Figures 1, 2, and 3 show every possible shape of trees with at most two layers. In
particular, the tree in Figure 1 corresponds to a pair of primes congruent 3 modulo 4; the tree in
Figure 2 corresponds to a pair of primes, one congruent 3 modulo 4 and the second congruent 5
modulo 8; lastly, the tree in Figure 3 corresponds to a pair of primes congruent 5 modulo 8.
Note that every set of four nodes, directly connected to the same node, can be identified by a single
label, say the coset leader, since the set of labels of these nodes can be seen as a coset of V4.
The next two lemmas show how to use the tree to identify the correct root of X2 = b mod N , but,
unfortunately, they also show that the residuosity connected with θ(.) discloses the factorization
of N .
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Figure 3: Tree representation of the 2-group of order 22 × 22 in Z∗5·13
Lemma 4 Assume that the exponent α(2fN + 1) is public, together with a table T of 2h+k−2 elements,
containing one of the two positive elements for each set of 4 elements of the group G2, as described in its tree
representation. Then, only two bits are sufficient to identify a square root m of b, that is, one bit for the sign
of m, and one bit telling whether |θ(m)|, the absolute value of θ(m), can or cannot be found in the table.
PROOF When the sender wants to encrypt m, then the triple {b, b0, b1} is sent, where b = m2 mod
N , b0 is the sign of m, and b1 = I(|θ(m)| ∈ T ), with I being the indicator function.
Given [b, b0, b1] and knowing the factorization ofN = pq, the right valuem is identified as follows:
1. Solve the equation x2 = b mod N and find four values [A,−A,B,−B]
2. Compute [|θ(A)|, |θ(B)|], one of these two values is in the table, therefore select the one
compatible with b1.
3. Define the correct value m using the previous value and b0.

Unfortunately, the disclosure of α(2fN + 1) leads to factoring N .
Lemma 5 Assuming that α(2fN + 1) is known, then the probability of factoring N is not less than 1/2.
PROOF It has been shown that, knowing ψ, N can be factored. Picking an integer xr at random,
the probability that u = xα(2fN+1)r is below ψ or−ψ in the tree is at least 1/2. In the favorable event
that u is below ψ or −ψ, a power of u with a convenient exponent 2f(u) gives ψ. The probability is
exactly 1/2 in the case of Blum primes, otherwise it is greater, as can be deduced from the trees.

In conclusion, the scheme allows us in principle to compute two bits discriminating the four roots
of b, by means of functions computable using only m, N and not its factorization. Unfortunately,
the additional information made public, the table and the exponent, permit the factorization of
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N deterministically, since ψ can be retrieved from the table, as well as probabilistically with high
probability, as a consequence of Lemma 5.
Therefore, it is necessary to look at different kinds of higher-order residuosity, which should pro-
vide
• a definition of symbols a la Jacobi specifying the residue character;
• a reciprocity law for these symbols;
• the values of the symbols should belong to a finite group which does not reveal any infor-
mation allowing the factorization of N .
Let ` denote the height of the tree T, and ζ2` be a primitive root of unity; it turns out that such
a 2`-residuosity exists in the ring of integers Z[ζ2` ] of cyclotomic fields Q(ζ2`). Let ν ∈ Z[ζ2` ] be
irreducible. A symbol of residuosity may be defined, [11, Theorem 46, p.211], as[
b
ν
]
2`
= b
N (ν)−1
2` mod ν = ζγ(b)
2`
, (8)
where N (ν) is the norm of ν in Q(ζ2`), γ(b) is an integer that certainly exists, since ζ2` and b
N (ν)−1
2`
are both roots of X2
` − 1 mod ν.
Using this residuosity, the difficulty becomes that of computing γ(b); however, in the case of quar-
tic residuosity, the task is made possible by Gauss-Jacobi’s quartic residue symbols and their reci-
procity law, as will be shown in the next subsection.
4.1 Identification scheme using quartic residuosity
Assuming that p and q are congruent 5 modulo 8, it will now be shown that the quartic residuosity
in Gaussian integers is sufficient to discriminate the 4 square roots with exactly 2 bits.
Let Z[i] be the ring of Gaussian integers, which is Euclidean, so that the factorization is unique
except for a reordering and a multiplication by units. The units are U = {1,−1, i,−i} and form
a cyclic group [14]. Any integer z = x + iy in Z[i] has four associates, namely z,−z, iz, and −iz.
In Z[i] the rational primes p congruent 1 modulo 4 split as p = (a + ib)(a − ib), and 2 splits as
2 = (1 + i)(1− i). The following notions and properties are taken from [16, p.119-127], which we
refer to for proofs and details.
Definition 1 An integer x+ iy of Z[i] is said to be primary if x+ iy = 1 mod (1 + i)3.
An integer z ∈ Z[i] is said to be odd if it is not divisible by 1 + i.
The norm of x+ iy ∈ Z[i] is N (x+ iy) = x2 + y2.
Note that any odd integer x+ iy has an associated primary which can be obtained upon multipli-
cation by a unit. The following theorem will now be proved:
Theorem 1 An odd prime p congruent 5 modulo 8 has the representation, as a sum of two squares, of the
form p = (2X + 1)2 + 4(2Y + 1)2, then in Z[i] it decomposes as
p = ((2X + 1) + 2(2Y + 1)i)((2X + 1)− 2(2Y + 1)i) ,
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and a primary factor is
pi = ((2X + 1) + 2(2Y + 1)i)(−1)X−1 .
PROOF Since p can be written as the sum of two squares p = (2X + 1)2 + 4y2, the first part of the
lemma is proved by showing that y is odd. Taking p modulo 8 we have
p mod 8 = 5 = 4X(X + 1) + 1 + 4y2 = 1 + 4y2 ⇒ 4y2 = 4 mod 8⇒ y2 = 1 mod 2 ,
which implies y = 1 mod 2.
The prime factor pi of p in Z[i] is primary if it is congruent 1 modulo −2 + 2i. Imposing this
condition, with u a unit, and considering that 4 = 0 mod (−2 + 2i), we have
1 = ((2X + 1) + 2i(2Y + 1))u mod (−2 + 2i) = u(2X + 3) mod (−2 + 2i) ,
because 2i = 2 mod (−2 + 2i). We distinguish two cases:
1. If X is even then u must satisfy the condition 3u = 1 mod (−2 + 2i), which forces u = −1,
that is u = (−1)X−1.
2. If X is odd then u must satisfy the condition 5u = 1 mod (−2 + 2i), which forces u = 1, that
is, again, u = (−1)X−1.
This concludes the proof.

Let pi ∈ Z[i] be an irreducible of odd norm, and pi |/ α. There exists a unique integer j, [16, p.122],
such that
α
N (pi)−1
4 = ij mod pi .
This property is used to define a quartic residue symbol as[
α
pi
]
4
=
{
ij if pi |/ α
0 otherwise
.
Let ν = a + ib be a primary odd number, then a Jacobi-like symbol for quartic residues, written
as
[
β
ν
]
4
and called the Gauss-Jacobi symbol, is defined multiplicatively, similarly to the Jacobi
symbol in the quadratic case. It satisfies the following properties [16, 20] that allow us to evaluate
the symbol without knowing the factorization of the arguments:
1.
[
α+ µν
ν
]
4
=
[
α
ν
]
4
,
2.
[
αβ
ν
]
4
=
[
α
ν
]
4
[
β
ν
]
4
,
3.
[
i
ν
]
4
= i−
a−1
2 and thus
[ −1
ν
]
4
= (−1)a−12 ,
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4.
[
1 + i
ν
]
4
= i
a−1−b−b2
4 and thus
[
2
ν
]
4
= i
−b
2 ,
5. If ω = c + di is a primary number of odd norm, its real part c is odd, then either c or −c is
congruent 1 modulo 4; it follows that the real part of ω or −ω is congruent 1 modulo 4. Let
α = u + vi and β = t + wi have odd norm, with the real part congruent 1 modulo 4; the
reciprocity law takes the Jacobi-Kaplan form[
α
β
]
4
[
β
α
]−1
4
= (−1) v·w4 .
The main theorem of this section provides the means to identify the four square roots of a quadratic
residue in Z[i] using only two bits and without unveiling the factorization of N or ν.
Proceeding as previously in the definition of ψ1 and ψ2, given pi1, pi2 relatively prime integers in
Z[i], we can find ξ1, ξ2 such that ξ1 + ξ2 = 1, ξ1 = µ2pi2 and ξ2 = µ1pi1 for some µ1, µ2 ∈ Z[i], and
set ξ = ξ1 − ξ2, which turns out to be a square root of 1 modulo ν = pi1pi2, i.e. ξ2 = 1 mod ν.
Theorem 2 Let ν = pi1pi2 be the product of two primary primes having norms congruent 5 modulo 8. A
root α among the four square roots {γ,−γ, γξ,−γξ} of a quadratic residue β = α2 mod ν can be uniquely
identified with two bits b0 and b1 defined as:
b0 =
{
1 if <(α) > 0
0 if <(α) < 0 ,
(use =(α) if <(α) = 0);
b1 =

1 if
[
α
ν
]
4
∈ {1, i}
0 if
[
α
ν
]
4
∈ {−1,−i}
.
PROOF. With the given choice of b0, the parameter b1 must discriminate α from αξ or −αξ. Due
to the multiplicative property of the Gauss-Jacobi symbol, this is tantamount to showing that[
ξ
ν
]
4
=
[ −ξ
ν
]
4
= −1. Indeed we have
[
ξ
ν
]
4
=
[
ξ
pi1
]
4
[
ξ
pi2
]
4
=
[
ξ1 − ξ2
pi1
]
4
[
ξ1 − ξ2
pi2
]
4
=
[
ξ1
pi1
]
4
[ −ξ2
pi2
]
4
.
But ξ1 = 1− ξ2 and conversely ξ2 = 1− ξ1, so we obtain the expression[
ξ
ν
]
4
=
[
1− ξ2
pi1
]
4
[ −(1− ξ1)
pi2
]
4
=
[
1
pi1
]
4
[ −1
pi2
]
4
= −1 .
This conclusion follows because, by Theorem 1, pi2 is of the form ((2X + 1) + 2(2Y + 1)i)(−1)X−1,
which implies [ −1
pi2
]
4
= (−1) (2X+1)(−1)
X−1−1
2 = −1 ,
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since the exponent is always odd, whatever be the parity of X .
In the same way
[ −ξ
ν
]
4
= −1 by exchanging the roles of pi1 and pi2.
In summary,
[
α
ν
]
4
= −
[
αξ
ν
]
4
= −
[ −αξ
ν
]
4
, then b1 ∈ {0, 1} distinguishes between the two
roots with the same b0.

Remark 3. Let N be equal to the norm of ν, then a representation of the elements of the finite
ring Zν = Z[i]/νZ[i], which is isomorphic to ZN , may consist of the same elements of ZN . A more
”natural” representation of Zν consists of N elements of Z[i], which have minimum Euclidean
norm and are not congruent to one another modulo ν. The two representations are perfectly
equivalent, the use of one or the other only depending on the simplicity of computations and
arithmetic operations in Z[i]/νZ[i].
LetN = pq be decomposed in Z[i] as a product νν¯, where ν = pi1pi2 is the product of an irreducible
factor of p and an irreducible factor of q. Noting that ν and ν¯ are relatively prime, any number f
of ZN is uniquely identified by the pair [f1, f2] obtained by taking the remainders modulo ν and
modulo ν¯, i.e. f1 = f mod ν, f2 = f mod ν¯, and f2 is easily seen to be the complex conjugate f¯1 of
f1. The value f is recovered from the pair [f1, f¯1], by using the Chinese remainder theorem
f = f1ζ1 + f¯1ζ2 mod N , (9)
where ζ1 = µ1ν¯ mod N , and ζ2 = µ2ν mod N , are the complex counterparts of ψ1 and ψ2, with
µ1 and µ2 computed by means of the generalized Euclidean algorithm. It is pointed out, as a
consequence of equation (9), that a quadratic residue m modulo N is also a quadratic residue
modulo ν, and a square root A of m modulo N corresponds to a square root α of m modulo ν.
Considering ψ, as defined in (4), we have that −A corresponds to −α, Aψ corresponds to αξ, and
−Aψ corresponds to −αξ because ξ = ψ mod ν. This last identity is straightforwardly proved, by
observing that
1 = ψ1 + ψ2 = λ2q + λ1p = λ2pi2p¯i2 + λ1pi1p¯i1
in Z[i], thus, taking the remainder modulo ν, we have
1 = (λ2p¯i2)pi2 + (λ1p¯i1)pi1 mod ν = ξ1 + ξ2 mod ν ,
due to the definition of ξ1 and ξ2, and finally ξ1 = ψ1 mod ν and ξ2 = ψ2 mod ν, by the Chinese
remainder theorem.
A Rabin scheme working with primes p and q congruent 5 modulo 8 can then be defined, by
considering the decomposition N = νν¯ with ν = pi1pi2 being the product of two primary factors of
p and q respectively.
Public-key: [ν].
Message: m.
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Encrypted message [C, b0, b1], where
C = m2 mod N , b0 = m mod 2 , and b1 =

1 if
[
m
ν
]
4
∈ {1, i}
0 if
[
m
ν
]
4
∈ {−1,−i}
.
Decryption stage :
- compute, as in (3), the four roots of C modulo N , written as positive numbers,
- take the two roots having the same parity specified by b0, say z1 and z2,
- compute the quartic residues [
z1
ν
]
4
[
z2
ν
]
4
,
and take the root corresponding to b1.
4.1.1 Semantic security of the Rabin scheme with p = q = 5 mod 8
In [29] semantic security is considered for pairs of Blum primes by means of the so-called Rabin-
Paillier’s scheme. It is shown that the same scheme works equally well for pairs of primes p = q =
5 mod 8, provided that quartic residuosity is used. Rabin-Paillier’s encryption scheme is recalled
and adapted as follows.
• Secret key: Two prime numbers p = q = 5 mod 8 are factored in Z[i] as p = pi1p¯i1 and
q = pi2p¯i2, pi1 and pi2 primary.
• Public key: ν = pi1pi2, e, where e is a prime |n|2 < |e| < |n| with n = νν¯, and |n| being the
bit-length of n.
• Plaintext: m ∈ Zn
• Ciphertext:
c = r2e +mn mod n2 (10)
where r ∈ Zn is randomly chosen such that
[
r
ν
]
4
= 1 and r > n2 .
• Decryption: Let E = cd mod n, where ed = 1 mod φ(n), then it is immediate to see that
E = r2 mod n .
We can solve the quadratic equation x2 = E mod n, and find r > n2 uniquely satisfying[
r
ν
]
4
= 1. Finally, substituting into (10), we obtain m.
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Remark 4. It should be noted that Rabin-Paillier’s encryption scheme exploits, as does the Rabin
scheme, the difficulty of computing the roots of quadratic equations in residue rings, but is other-
wise a completely different algorithm.
Further, it is noted that semantic security is achieved under proper assumptions and by doubling
the number of bits of the encrypted message. This extra cost seems to be unavoidable [19].
4.2 General scenario: any pair of primes
In principle, root identification in the case of pairs of primes p and q of the type 4k + 1, which
are congruent modulo a suitable power 2t, may be achieved by considering residuosity of higher
order and cyclotomic fields Q(ζ2t) as shown in equation (8). The plan is to consider residuos-
ity of order 2t so that −1 is non-residue modulo prime factors of p and q in Q(ζ2t), and evaluate
the 2t-th residue modulo a factor ν of N in Q(ζ2t) using some form of reciprocity that allows
a reduction via the Euclidean algorithm, operations that do not disclose the factorization of N .
However, a limit upon this plan is that its extension to residuosity of higher order is straightfor-
ward only up to Q(ζ32) because these fields are Euclidean [17]. The next field, Q(ζ64), has class
number 17, thus is certainly not Euclidean, hence a reduction via the Euclidean algorithm is not
possible. Also, integer division with remainder may not be easy to perform in the fields Q(ζ2t),
t ≥ 4. It is known that for Gaussian integers Z[i], i.e. t = 2, the division may be performed by
rounding the entries of the quotient of integers v = v0+v1iν = (a0; a1) ∈ Q2 to their nearest in-
tegers, a′0 + a′1i = (ba0 + 12c; ba1 + 12c) ∈ Z2. The remainder of minimum norm is obtained as
r0 + r1i = (v0 + v1i)− ν · (a0 + a1i).
It is also known that the 1-step norm-Euclidean algorithm for Z[ζ8], i.e. t = 3, devised by Eisen-
stein [7], is implicitly defined by rounding, and [22, Sec. 4.1] includes an explicit proof.
In point of fact, the use of residuosity appears in practice to be not convenient, perhaps impossi-
ble, even for primes of the form 2t(2k + 1) + 1, t ≥ 3. Further, it does not work for pairs of primes
with different residues modulo 2t. In the search for different solutions, the next section proposes
a scheme that allows the roots in Rabin algorithm to be identified, that works for every pair of
primes.
4.2.1 Group isomorphisms
In this section, a method is described that works for any pair of primes, which may have acceptable
complexity and be of practical interest, although it requires a one-way function that might be
weaker than factoring, and entails communicating more bits than the theoretical lower bound of
2. The following approach relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms.
GivenN , letP = µN+1 be a prime (the smallest prime), that certainly exists by Dirichlet’s theorem
[1], that is congruent 1 moduloN . Let g be a primitive element generating the multiplicative group
Z∗P .
Define g1 = gµ and g2 = gµ(ψ1−ψ2), and as usual let m denote the message.
Public key: [N,P, g1, g2].
Encryption stage: [C, b0, d1, d2, p1, p2], where C = m2 mod N , b0 = m mod 2, p1 is a position in the
binary expansion of gm1 mod P , whose bit d1 is different from the bit in the corresponding
position of the binary expansion of gm2 mod P , and p2 is a position in the binary expansion of
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gm1 mod P , whose bit d2 is different from the bit in the corresponding position of the binary
expansion of g−m2 mod P .
Decryption stage :
- compute, as in (3), the four roots, written as positive numbers,
- take the two roots having the same parity specified by b0, say z1 and z2,
- compute A = gz11 mod P and B = g
z2
1 mod P
- between z1 and z2, the root is selected that has the correct bits d1 and d2 in both the given
positions p1 and p2 of the binary expansion of A or B.
The algorithm is justified by the following Lemma. Notice that g−m2 must also be considered
because, using notations of Lemma 1, it is necessary to distinguish e.g. x1 from x2 or x3, but it is
not known which of the two, a priori.
Lemma 6 The power g0 = gµ generates a cyclic group of order N in Z∗P , thus the correspondence x↔ gx0
establishes an isomorphism between a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗P and the additive group of ZN . Let z0
denote any of the four roots z1, z2, z3, z4 of x2 = C mod N ,
(
C
p
)
=
(
C
q
)
= 1; these four roots, in
the order
{z0, −z0, z0(ψ1 − ψ2), −z0(ψ1 − ψ2)} ,
are in a one-to-one correspondence with the ordered four powers of g0 computed modulo P
{gz00 , g−z00 , gz0(ψ1−ψ2)0 , g−z0(ψ1−ψ2)0 } ,
and different values of z0 simply yield a re-ordering of this set.
PROOF. The first part is due to the choice of P : the group generated by g0 has order N , thus the
isomorphism follows immediately. The second part is a consequence of Section 2.1.

The price to pay is the costly arithmetic in ZP , and the equivalence of the security of the Rabin
cryptosystem with the hardness of factoring is now conditioned by the complexity of computing
the discrete logarithm in ZP .
Remark 5. In line with the above solution, the following more general approach is possible:
choose a one-way function d (exponentiation with base g1 above) defined from ZN into a group
G of the same order, and build from it a function d1(exponentiation with base g2 above) such that
d1(x1) = d(x2), with x1 and x2 as defined in Lemma 1. The public key contains the two func-
tions d and d1. At the encryption stage, both are evaluated at the same argument, the message
m, and the minimum information necessary to distinguish their values is delivered together with
the encrypted message. The true limitation of this scheme is that d must be a one-way function,
otherwise two square roots that allow us to factor N can be recovered, as shown earlier in dealing
with residuosity.
Remark 6. Some variants of this method that may be of practical interest are:
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1. In the scheme of section 4.2.1, instead of considering the parity bit of the plain message, a bit
indicating whether the message is greater or smaller than N2 does the job; note that this bit
does not reveal the parity of the message.
2. In the scheme of section 4.2.1, instead of using a parity bit or the variant proposed in point
1, a further pair d3 and p3 (defined similarly to d1 and p1 considering the power g−m1 ) is sent
at some extra cost, but no information about the plain message is revealed.
5 The Rabin signature
In the introduction, it was said that a Rabin signature of a message m may consist of a pair
[n, S]; however, if x2 = m mod N has no solution, this signature cannot be directly generated.
To overcome this obstruction, a random pad U was proposed [25]; attempts are repeated until
x2 = mU mod N is solvable, and the signature is the triple (m,U, S), [25]. A verifier compares
mU mod N with S2 and accepts the signature as valid when these two numbers are equal.
This section presents a modified version of this scheme, in which no attempts are needed to derive
U . Now, the quadratic equation x2 = m mod N is solvable if and only if m is a quadratic residue
modulo N , that is m is a quadratic residue modulo p and modulo q. When m is not a quadratic
residue, it is shown below how to exploit the Jacobi symbol to compute a suitable pad and obtain
quadratic residues modulo p and q. Let
f1 =
m1
2
[
1−
(
m1
p
)]
+
1
2
[
1 +
(
m1
p
)]
, f2 =
m2
2
[
1−
(
m2
q
)]
+
1
2
[
1 +
(
m2
q
)]
.
Writing m = m1ψ1 +m2ψ2, the equation
x2 = (m1ψ1 +m2ψ2)(f1ψ1 + f2ψ2) = m1f1ψ1 +m2f2ψ2
is always solvable moduloN , becausem1f1 andm2f2 are clearly quadratic residues modulo p and
modulo q, respectively, since
(
m1
p
)
=
(
f1
p
)
,
(
m2
q
)
=
(
f2
q
)
, so that
(
m1f1
p
)
=
(
m1
p
)(
f1
p
)
= 1 ,
(
m2f2
q
)
=
(
m2
q
)(
f2
q
)
= 1 .
Note that if p and q are Blum primes, it is possible to choose f1 =
(
m1
p
)
and f2 =
(
m2
q
)
. The
following procedure may be described:
Public-key: N
Signed message: [U,m, S], where U = R2 [f1ψ1 + f2ψ2] mod N is the padding factor, with R a
random number, and S is any solution of the equation x2 = mU mod N . R is needed to
avoid knowledge of U enabling N to be easily factored.
Verification: compute mU mod N and S2 mod N ; the signature is valid if and only if these two
numbers are equal.
This signature scheme has several interesting features:
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1. signature is possible using any pair of primes, and thus it could for example be used with
the modulo of any RSA public key;
2. different signatures of the same document are different;
3. the verification only requires two multiplications, therefore it is fast enough to be used in
authentication protocols.
5.1 Forgery attacks
Schemes of this type are, however, vulnerable to forgery attacks: it is relatively easy to compute
S2 mod N , choose any message m′, compute U ′ = S2m′−1 mod N , and forge the signature as
(m′, U ′, s) without knowing the factorization of N . In some variants, a hash H(m) is used instead
of m and S is a solution of x2 = H(mU) mod N , but this does not help against the above forgery
attack. The following variant aims at countering this vulnerability.
Public-key: N
Signed message: [m,UK2 mod N,SK3 mod N,K4 mod N ], where U is the padding factor, K a
random number, and S is any solution of the equation x2 = mU mod N .
Verification: compute (SK3)2 mod N and mUK2K4 mod N ; the signature is valid if and only if
these two numbers are equal.
Note that U , K and S are not known. Forgery would be possible if K were known, but to know K
one has to solve an equation of degree at least 2. To verify the signature only two multiplications
and one square are needed.
Note that there is another signature scheme relying on the difficulty of finding square roots, the
Rabin-Williams signature (cf. [12]), which avoids the forgery vulnerability. While that scheme
requires the use of two primes, respectively congruent to 3 and 7 modulo 8, the two variants above
do not need this condition. Moreover, in the Rabin-Williams scheme, a message cannot be signed
twice in two different ways, otherwise the factorization of N might be exposed. In the above
schemes, using a deterministic pad as above allows different signatures of the same message.
For more on forgery and blindness on Rabin signatures, please refer also to [8].
6 Conclusions and Remarks
A few comments follows on Rabin schemes in general, after having mainly dwelt on deterministic
aspects and identification problems.
In principle, the Rabin scheme is very efficient because only one square is required for encryption;
furthermore, it is provably as secure as factoring. Nevertheless, it is well known [4, 15] that it
presents some drawbacks, mainly due to the four-to-one mapping, that may discourage its use to
conceal the content of a message. These are:
• root identification requires the delivery of additional information, which may increase com-
putational costs;
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• many proposed root identification methods, based on the message semantics, have a proba-
bilistic character and cannot be used in some circumstances;
• the delivery of two bits together with the encrypted message exposes the process to active
attacks by maliciously modifying these bits. For example, suppose an attacker A sends an
encrypted message to B asking that the decrypted message be delivered to a third party
C (a friend of A). If in the encrypted message the bit that identifies the root, between the
two roots of the same parity, had been deliberately changed, A can get a root from C that,
combined with the original message, enables the Rabin public-key to be factored. Even our
Variant II is not immune to this kind of active attack.
In conclusion, the Rabin scheme may suffer from some drawbacks when used to conceal a mes-
sage, whereas it seems effective when applied to generate an electronic signature or as a hash
function. However, these observations do not exclude the practical use of the Rabin scheme (as is
actually done in some standardized protocols), when other properties, like integrity and authen-
ticity, need to be safeguarded, along with message secrecy, in a public-encryption protocol.
7 Acknowledgments
Some of this work was done while the first author was Visiting Professor with the University
of Trento, funded by CIRM, and he would like to thank the Department of Mathematics for the
friendly and fruitful atmosphere offered. The third author was supported by the Swiss National
Science Foundation under grant No. 132256. We would also like to thank Steven Galbraith for his
comments on a preliminary version of the paper and for pointing out some references.
Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the many suggestions and corrections offered by anonymous
referees which have greatly improved the readability and quality of the paper.
References
[1] T.M. Apostol, Introduction to Analytic Number Theory, Springer, New York, 1976.
[2] E. Bach, J. Shallit, Algorithmic Number Theory, MIT, Cambridge Mass., 1996.
[3] D.J. Bernstein, Proving tight security for Rabin-Williams signatures, EUROCRYPT 2008 (N. P.
Smart, ed.), LNCS, vol. 4965, Springer, 2008, pp. 70–87.
[4] J.A. Buchmann, Introduction to Cryptography, Springer, New York, 1999.
[5] D.G. Cantor, H. Zassenhaus, A new Algorithm for Factoring Polynomials over Finite Fields,
Math. Comp., Vol. 36, N. 154, April 1981, pp.587-592.
[6] R. Dedekind, Schreiben an Herrn Borchardt, J. Reine Angew. Math., 83, 1877, pp.265-292.
[7] G. Eisenstein, U¨ber einige allgemeine Eigenschaften der Gleichung, von welcher die Theilung
der ganzen Lemniscate abha¨ngt, nebst Anwendungen derselben auf die Zahlentheorie, J.
Reine Angew. Math., 39 (1850), 224-274; 275-287.
22
[8] M. Elia, D. Schipani, On the Rabin signature, J. Discrete Math. Sci. Cryptogr., Vol. 16, no.6,
(2013), pp.367-378.
[9] M. Elia, D. Schipani, Improvements on the Cantor-Zassenhaus Factorization Algorithm, to
appear in Math. Bohem.
[10] D.M. Freeman, O. Goldreich, E. Kiltz, A. Rosen, G. Segev, More Constructions of Lossy and
Correlation-Secure Trapdoor Functions, PKC 2010, Springer LNCS 6056 (2010), pp.279-295.
[11] A. Fro¨hlich, M.J. Taylor, Algebraic Number Theory, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994.
[12] S. Galbraith, The Mathematics of Public Key Cryptography, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012.
[13] E. Grosswald, Topics from the Theory of Numbers, Birkha¨user, Basel, 2009.
[14] G.H. Hardy, E.M. Wright, An Introduction to the Theory of Numbers, Oxford at the Clarendon
Press, 1971.
[15] J. Hoffstein, J. Pipher, J.H. Silverman, An introduction to mathematical cryptography, Springer,
New York, 2008.
[16] K. Ireland, M. Rosen, A Classical Introduction to Modern Number Theory, Springer, New York,
1998.
[17] N. Kaiblinger, Cyclotomic rings with simple Euclidean algorithm, JP J. Algebra Number Theory
Appl., 23, no. 1, 2011, pp.61-76.
[18] K. Kurosawa, T. Itoh, and M. Takeuchi, Public Key Cryptosystem Using a Reciprocal Number
with the same Intractability as Factoring a Large Number, CRYPTOLOGIA, vol. XII, pp. 225-
233, 1988.
[19] K. Kurosawa, T. Takagi, One-Wayness Equivalent to General Factoring, IEEE Trans. on Inform.
Theory, vol. 55, No.9, September 2009, pp. 4249-4262.
[20] F. Lemmermeyer, Reciprocity Laws, Springer, New York, 2000.
[21] A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, S.A. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press,
Boca Raton, 1997.
[22] C. Monico, M. Elia, On the Representation of Primes in Q(
√
2) as Sums of Squares, JP J.
Algebra Number Theory Appl., 8, no. 1, 2007, pp.121-133.
[23] Paillier P., Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes, EU-
ROCRYPT, Springer. (1999), pp. 223238.
[24] Paillier P., Pointcheval D., Efficient Public-Key Cryptosystems Provably Secure Against Ac-
tive Adversaries, Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Volume 1716, 1999, pp 165-179
[25] J. Pieprzyk, T. Hardjono, J. Seberry, Fundamentals of Computer Security, Springer, New York,
2003.
23
[26] M. Rabin, Digitalized signature as intractable as factorization,
Technical Report MIT/LCS/TR-212, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, January 1978.
[27] H. Rademacher, E. Grosswald, Dedekind Sums, MAA, New York, 1972.
[28] B. Schneier, Applied cryptography, Wiley, 1996.
[29] T. Takagi, S. Naito, Extension of Rabin Cryptosystem to Eisenstein and Gauss Fields, IEICE
Trans. Fundamentals, Vol. E80-A, No. 4, April 1997.
[30] J. von zur Gathen, J. Gerhard, Modern Computer Algebra, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999.
[31] H.C. Williams, A modification of the RSA public-key encryption procedure, IEEE Trans. on
Inform. Th., IT-26(6), November 1980, pp.726-729.
24
